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Reviewed by
JOHN J. REGAN, C.M.*

Three lectures given at the University of
Texas in December, 1960, at the invitation
of the Permanent Committee for the Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise, form the contents of this short book by the former Attorney General of the United States. He
addresses himself to a lay audience "who
often cannot understand the approach of
judges to the controversial problems of
constitutional law which they are called on
to 'administer.' "1
The rather broad title of the book suggests the outline followed by the author.
The first lecture reviews in enthusiastic and
admiring terms the personality and thought
of Holmes, particularly as they affected
his views on the judicial process. Mr.
Biddle then takes up the sword in his
second lecture to do battle with the
"crusading fanatics," Jesuit Fathers Ford,
Lucey and Kenealy, who have criticized
the philosophy of Holmes. 2 His final lecture

is little more than a summary of general
principles of constitutional interpretation
expressed by the participants in the "Marshall Conference" at Harvard University in
September, 1955, published under the title
"Government Under Law," 3 and will not
be reviewed here.
The picture of Holmes which emerges
from the first lecture is a traditional one.
We see the energetic Yankee conservative
full of inconsistencies and contradictions:
"his faith and skepticism; his personal arrogance, and the humility with which he
approaches his own credo; his Puritanism
-and his taste for improprieties coupled
with his impulse to shock; his distrust of
theories and his habit of indulging in
them." 4 We are reminded of Holmes' restraint in exercising judicial review of legis-
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lation 5 and his emphasis on "experience" in
the formation of law.6 No new insight into
Holmes' thought results from this portrait.
The second lecture, however, reveals
many serious flaws in the author's presen-

tation. Seldom has more insulting language
been used in what purports to be a serious
legal writing, albeit directed to laymen.

The highly personal and abusive terms
aimed at the intelligence, reputation and
competence of the Jesuit critics of Holmes
leads one to question, at the very least, the
7
objectivity of the author.
In addition to his lack of good manners,
Mr. Biddle is guilty of the charge he repeatedly hurls at Holmes' critics. He misunderstands the thought of his opponents.
His knowledge of natural law theory, and
in particular Scholastic natural law, is
singularly inadequate. Natural law for him

is a system of moral absolutes created by
the Catholic Church8 with "an existence of
their own, outside the mind of man,"' a
view which readers familiar with Greek
and Stoic philosophy would challenge.
These "dogmatic" absolutes are capable of
solving all human problems, and therefore
the judge and the lawyer need only bring
them into focus to decide all cases presented to them.' 0 The natural law theory
of Blackstone- and the various "natural
rights" philosophies 12 are part of this Catholic dogma, a rather amazing discovery

after the work done by Thomist scholars
13
in recent years to separate these theories.
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Many basic concepts in St. Thomas'
treatise on law have been ignored by Mr.
Biddle. Aquinas clearly recognized, for example, the variability of natural law conclusions in particular cases 14 and the necessity for positive law to give detailed content to the otherwise general principles of
natural law. 5 The author goes so far as
to state: "Father Ford had been brought
up . . . on St. Thomas Aquinas and his

doctrine that all law is based on natural
law implanted by God in man,"' 6 an oversimplification of Aquinas' thought about
the modes of derivation of human law
from natural law.

17

The author thus summarizes the charges
which his Jesuit opponents have leveled
against Holmes:
[H]e was a skeptic and a cynic who believed
in no God and had no principles; he considered that law was nothing but the use
of force, and that might makes right; he
discarded all absolutes, including natural
law, and defined truth as the vote of the
majority; and he described morals as nothing but a curb on the normal human inclination to get your feet in the trough.' 8
Yet Mr. Biddle himself admits in many
places that Holmes was a skeptic-indeed
he traces the origin of his skepticism to
his military service in the Civil War.' He
nowhere claims that Holmes believed in a
personal God. He praises Holmes for his
rejection of absolutes and his preference
for subjective "can't helps" over objective
truth.'
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The logic of Mr. Biddle's refutation is
difficult to follow. Holmes, he says, had a
sense of the "mystery of the universe."2 1
He shared with other men of his time "acceptance of the ordinary decencies-courage, abstinence, truth, a sane mind in a
healthy body, honesty, and loyalty. '22 Mr.
Biddle's reasoning thus seems to say:
Holmes was a good man; therefore his
philosophy was true.
A detailed analysis of Mr. Biddle's other
charges and refutations is beyond the scope
of this review. Two impressions, however,
emerge from a close reading. The author
seems ill-equipped for philosophical argumentation, and his admiration for Holmes
has blinded him to the implications of his
hero's thought.
Mr. Biddle has done a disservice to

Holmes in this book, for there is much of
value in Holmes' thought for the natural law
advocate. The Justice's cautions against excessive reliance on logic and history in the
judicial process 23 and his insistence that
judges recognize their duty of weighing the
competing "considerations of social advantage''24 are certainly in the spirit of
Aquinas' definition of law 22 and the place
accorded by him to "equity" in the judicial
process.26 Perhaps future lecturers in this
series will have more to contribute to an
understanding of Holmes' thought in relation to the natural law tradition. Mr. Biddle has not done the job.
The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED
180, 187 (1920).
24 Id.at 181.
23 HOLMES,
LEGAL

PAPERS

I, 1I,q. 90, art. 4.
Id., I-IL, q. 60, art. 5; q. 120, art. 1. St.
Thomas here adopts the Aristotelian concept of
epikeia.
25 SUMMA THEOLOGICA,

26

221d. at 19-23.
22 Id. at 34.

CITIZENSHIP STATUS
(Continued)
statement in referring to the Administrative Procedure Act: ". . . these statutes appear clearly
to permit an action such as was brought here to
review the final administrative determination of
the Secretary of State." Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S.
367, 372 (1962). In distinguishing the Pedreiro
and Shung cases, the dissent said: "unlike
this case the relief sought in those cases
were sought only after the administrative
process had run its full course, and a 'final'
determination had been made by the At-

torney General." Id. at 397 (dissenting opinion).
The Court apparently felt the exhaustion point
was reached when the plaintiff came to his
choice of judicial review, whereas the dissent
apparently contends that there being no alter-

native relief, the plaintiff must apply for the certificate of identity and pursue habeas corpus
after a "final" denial of admission. See generally
Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303
U.S. 41 (1938); WASSERMAN, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND

PRACTICE

130-32b (1961); Schwartz,

Jurisdiction To Determine Jurisdiction In Federal Administrative Law, 38 GEo. L.J. 368
(1950).
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